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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] The advertisements you see while browsing the Internet are rarely 
accidental.  For instance, Alliance Data, one of many new companies in 
the booming data-marketing industry, can instantaneously recognize that a 
user visiting their client’s website is Joel Stein, a thirty-nine year-old, 
college educated male, who makes over $125,000 a year.1  Alliance Data 
also knows that Joel is likely to make purchases online, but only spends 
about $25 dollars a purchase.2  Using this information, and the specifics of 
                                                 
*Matthew Kirsch, J.D. Candidate, 2012, The George Washington University Law 
School; Member, The George Washington International Law Review; BBA, Emory 
University, 2009, Cum Laude.     
 
1 See Joel Stein, Data Mining: How Companies Now Know Everything About You, TIME 
MAGAZINE BUSINESS (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599, 
2058114,00.html.  
 
2 See id.  
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over 100 of Joel’s past online purchases, Alliance Data creates 
advertisements specifically tailored to Joel and displays them as he 
continues to browse the Internet.3   
 
[2] Unlike the majority of Internet users, Joel Stein, as a reporter, 
discovered the extent to which new data mining companies tracked him 
online.4  During his investigation, Joel found various data marketing 
companies that held detailed profiles about him, compiled from his online 
behavior.5  With varying degrees of accuracy, these profiles “knew” about 
Joel’s mortgage, car, hobbies, travel desires and more.6  Some of Joel’s 
discoveries were comical, such as the BlueKai profile that “knew” Joel 
was a nineteen year-old woman; most likely based on a recent splurge for 
his wife at an online lingerie website.7  Other revelations raised more 
serious concerns, such as when the CEO of Reputation.com found Joel’s 
social security number in a matter of hours.8  What these data mining 
companies know, or think they know, about Joel, highlights some of the 
concerns raised when corporations own, trade, and sell profiles filled with 
the intimate and private details of citizen’s lives.  
 
[3] This Article will argue that the upcoming revision of the European 
Union’s (“EU”) Data Protection Directive should require advertisers to 
utilize and respect a “Do-Not-Track” mechanism in order to provide 
consumers with a meaningful mechanism to consent, or refuse to consent, 
to the online collection of their data for use in behavioral advertising.  In 
Part II, the Article will provide an overview of the EU’s current data 
protection framework.  This Part will also look at the status of consent 
                                                 
3 See id. 
 
4 See id. 
 
5 See id. 
 
6 See Stein, supra note 1. 
 
7 See id. 
 
8 See id. 
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under the current framework.  It will then explain the EU’s motivations for 
the upcoming revision of the Data Protection Directive.  Next, this Part 
will explore the emergence of the behavioral advertising industry, 
followed by a discussion of some concerns this growth raises.  It will then 
examine Privacy by Design and Privacy Enhancing Technologies, broad 
categories of technologies designed to enhance electronic privacy.  
Finally, this Part will consider the sufficiency of industry self-regulation.  
Part III will argue for the implementation of a “Do-Not-Track” mechanism 
to provide citizens in the EU with a meaningful way to express informed 
consent to the online collection of their personal information for the 
purposes of behavioral advertising. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Data Protection in the European Union 
 
[4] In the 1970’s, the growing use of computers to process personal 
information led to the first calls for comprehensive data protection 
legislation.9  As a result, in 1995, the European Commission (“EC” or “the 
Commission”) adopted Directive 95/46 (the “Data Protection Directive” or 
“Directive”), which established a compressive framework for the 
processing of personal data.10  The Data Protection Directive derives its 
legal authority from Article 95 of the European Community Treaty, which 
allows for the creation of legislation designed to harmonize the internal 
market within the EU.11  
                                                 
9 See PETER CAREY, DATA PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UK AND EU LAW 1 
(3d ed. 2009). 
 
10 See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EU) [hereinafter Data Protection 
Directive]; CAREY, supra note 9, at 5. 
 
11 See Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 95, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 
321E) 37 (consolidated version); Alfonso Scirocco, The Lisbon Treaty and the Protection 
of Personal Data in the European Union, DATAPROTECTIONREVIEW.EU  (Aug. 8, 2008), 
http://www.madrid.org/cs/Satellite?c=CMRevistaFP&cid=1142425661164&esArticulo=t
rue&idRevistaElegida=1142398920499&language=en&pag=1&pagename=RevistaDatos
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[5] The Data Protection Directive has two principal aims.12  The first 
is the preservation of the fundamental right to data protection, and the 
second is to facilitate the free flow of personal data between and within 
EU member states.13  To accomplish its twin aims the Directive sets out a 
general framework for the processing of personal data.14  Article 6 
describes one of the central tenants of this framework, that “the processing 
of personal data must . . . be carried out with the consent of the data 
subject . . . .”15  Further, certain categories of data, such as religious, racial 
or health information are considered sensitive, and the Directive prohibits 
processing this data without the explicit affirmative consent of the data 
subject.16  The Directive also attempts to ensure the fair collection of data 
by requiring that data subjects receive notice of the “identity of the [data] 
controller[,] . . . the purposes of the processing . . . [and] any further 
information such as the recipients . . . [or whether the data subject has a] 
right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him … .”17 
 
                                                                                                                         
PersonalesIngles%2FPage%2FRDPI_home_RDP&siteName=RevistaDatosPersonalesIng
les. 
 
12 See CAREY, supra note 9, at 6. 
 
13 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Comprehensive 
Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, at 4, COM (2010) 609 
final (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/ 
consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf [hereinafter Call for Revision]; see also 
CAREY, supra note 9, at 6. 
 
14 See CAREY, supra note 9, at 5-6. 
 
15 Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, Preamble, para. 30.  
 
16 See id. art. 8, paras. 1, 2(a).  Certain narrow exceptions apply.  See id. art. 8, para. 2(b)-
(e).  
 
17 Id. art. 10. 
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[6] A landmark aspect of the Data Protection Directive is its formal 
recognition of the fundamental right to the protection of personal data, as 
set out in Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.18  Article 8 
provides that: 
 
1.  Everyone has the right to the protection 
of personal data concerning him or her. 
2.  Such data must be processed fairly for 
specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some 
other legitimate basis laid down by law.  
Everyone has the right of access to data 
which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified.19 
 
However, the Directive’s recognition of this right does not give Article 8 
binding legal effect; for many years, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
operated merely as a political commitment.20  This changed in 2007 when 
the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly included the right to the protection of 
personal data in Article 16b, resulting in the constitutional recognition of 
Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.21  When the Treaty of 
                                                 
18 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 
O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter EU Charter of Fundamental Rights]; Data Protection 
Directive, supra note 10, Preamble, paras. 2,7. 
 
19 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 18, art. 8.  
 
20 See Press Release, Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Presidents of the Commission, 
European Parliament and Council Sign and Solemnly Proclaim the Charter in Strasbourg 
(Dec. 12, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refere 
nce=IP/07/1916&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 
21 See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, art. 16 B & Declaration 20, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 
O.J. (C 306) 1, 51, 257 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]; see also Call for Revision, supra 
note 13, at 4; Press Release, Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 20.  
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Lisbon entered into force in 2009, the right to the protection of personal 
data finally had an independent, constitutional, and binding legal basis.22  
 
B. Consent in the EU Data Protection Framework 
 
[7] As will be discussed in more detail in Part II(C), the EU is in the 
process of revising the Data Protection Directive.23  A major reason for 
the revision of the Directive is the non-uniform implementation by EU 
Member States of what constitutes informed and free consent, especially 
in the context of behavioral advertising.24  This Part will begin by 
examining the meaning of consent within the data protection framework, 
with a focus on the new e-Privacy Directives.  It will then examine the 
Article 29 Working Party’s 2010 opinion on informed consent to 
behavioral advertising under the existing data protection framework.25  
Finally, it will attempt to derive the meaning of consent from relevant 
enforcement actions and case law. 
 
i. Consent in the e-Privacy Directives 
 
[8] In 2002, as a supplement to the Data Protection Directive, the EU 
adopted the e-Privacy Directive to address “the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector.”26  In 2009, the e-Privacy Directive was amended to further 
                                                 
22 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 4; Press Release, Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, supra note 20.  
 
23 See infra Part II.C.  
 
24 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 8-9.  See generally infra Part II.D (discussing 
behavioral advertising in detail). 
 
25 See infra Part II.B.ii.  
 
26 See Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EU) [hereinafter e-Privacy 
Directive]. 
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address the changing landscape of the Internet.27  The e-Privacy Directive 
and its amending Directive do not change or amend the Data Protection 
Directive itself, rather the new directives provide an extra set of 
regulations specific to electronic communications.28  Because the 
amended e-Privacy Directive addresses many of the same issues the 
revision of the Data Protection Directive intends to address, it is important 
that the two directives complement each other.29 
 
[9] A major provision added by the amended e-Privacy Directive 
requires data controllers to inform data subjects when placing cookies or 
similar tracking devices on a user’s terminal equipment.30  Data subjects 
must have the right to object to the use of cookies and other tracking 
devices.31  Unfortunately, despite its emphasis on cookies and consent, the 
amended e-Privacy Directive failed to clear up the confusion over implicit 
consent with respect to browser settings.32  For example, a recent draft of 
Finland’s implementing legislation for the amended e-Privacy Directive 
                                                 
27 See Council Directive 2009/136, art. 4, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11, 22 (EU) [hereinafter 
Amended e-Privacy Directive] (noting that the 2009 amendment of the e-Privacy 
Directive must be implemented by May 25, 2011). 
 
28 See CAREY, supra note 9, at 12. 
 
29 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 7.   
 
30 See Amended e-Privacy Directive, supra note 27, Preamble, para. 66.  For purposes of 
this Article “terminal equipment” is a term meant to include a person’s personal 
computer. 
 
31 See id.  
 
32 See Eija Warma & Vilja Kemppainen, Implementation of E-Privacy Directive in 
Finland: Will User-Friendliness Override Privacy in the Use of Cookies in Internet 
Services?, CASTREN & SNELLMAN (Feb. 18, 2011), http://castrensnellman. 
meteoriitti.com/Page/c1ccbac8-1bad-436e-bb79-e1ffaa00df14.aspx?groupId=cdeed881-
8278-43d3-9994-ccf6a6a633e7&announcementId=b841f3d0-0d3a-4c72-b9b3-3f036b00 
332e (“Recital 66 of the Directive states that the user’s consent may be received through 
browser settings.  As default settings of major browsers generally allow cookies, this 
standpoint would make the Directive’s impact on business quite minor.”). 
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specifically allows for a user’s browser settings to provide consent.33  
Contrast Finland’s approach with the UK’s, where Parliament is 
considering simply “copying and pasting” the language of the amended e-
Privacy Directive into national law and letting the courts figure out any 
ambiguities regarding the meaning of consent.34  Also, both France and 
the Netherlands have passed similar laws requiring prior opt-in consent for 
cookies.35 
 
ii. The Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion 
 
[10] Despite the present ambiguities regarding consent in the data 
protection framework, a 2010 opinion issued by the Article 29 Working 
Party may still present a comprehensive definition of consent.36  The 
newly amended e-Privacy Directive and the May 2011 deadline to 
implement the Directive into each Member State’s national laws prompted 
                                                 
33 See id.  
 
34 See Out-Law.com, UK Passes Buck on Europe's Cookie Law with Copy-Paste 
Proposal: You Sort It out, THE REG. UK (Sept. 17, 2010), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/17/eu_cookie_law/print.html. 
 
35 Hunton & Williams LLP, France Introduces Prior Opt-in Consent for Cookies, 
PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY LAW BLOG, http://www.huntonprivacyblog. 
com/2011/08/articles/european-union-1/france-introduces-prior-optin-consent-for-
cookies/ (specifying that opt-in consent may be given “via user controlled settings on the 
relevant device”); Nicole Wolters Ruckert and David Korteweg, New Dutch Cookie Law 
Requires Prior Consent from Internet Users, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS., https:// 
www.privacy association.org/public ations/2011_06_28_new_du tch_cookie_law_ 
requires_prior_consent_from_Internet_users (defining consent as “freely given, specific 
and well-informed”). 
 
36 See Opinion 2/2010 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on ‘Online 
Behavioural Advertising,’ WP 171 (June 22, 2010) 3, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf [hereinafter 
WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising]; CAREY, supra note 9, at 9 (“Article 
29 of the Directive set up a Working Party . . . to act as an independent advisory body . . . 
. Thus when considering the meaning of . . . the Directive . . . regard should be had to any 
relevant opinion that has been issued by the Working Party.”). 
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the issuance of the Working Party’s Opinion on Online Behavioural 
Advertising.37  While the Working Party’s opinions do not hold the force 
of law, they are still considered important in interpreting the data 
protection framework.38  
 
[11] The Opinion begins by noting that where the e-Privacy Directive 
addresses a specific subject matter, such as the use of cookies, its clauses 
should be read as controlling over a conflicting general clause in the 
original Data Protection Directive.39  However, if a cookie collects 
information that also fits the definition of personal data under the Data 
Protection Directive, then that Directive will apply in addition to the e-
Privacy Directive.40  Consequently, the behavioral advertising industry 
will be subject to both the Data Protection Directive and the e-Privacy 
Directive because the majority of data collected by third-party cookies will 
fall within the Data Protection Directive’s broad definition of personal 
data.41 
                                                 
37 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 3, 7-8. 
 
38 See CAREY, supra note 9, at 9. 
 
39 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 10. 
 
40 See id. at 9.  The Directive defines personal data as:  
 
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity . . . .   
 
Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, art. 2.  More information on the subtleties and 
scope of personal data, as interpreted by the Article 29 Working Party may be found in 
Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data.  See generally Opinion 4/2007 of the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on the ‘Concept of Personal Data,’ WP 136 
(June 20, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/ 
docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf. 
 
41 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 9 (“If as a 
result of placing and retrieving information through the cookie or similar device, the 
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[12] The Opinion also finds that Article 5(3) of the amended e-Privacy 
Directive generally restricts the use of cookies in behavioral advertising.42  
Article 5(3) provides in pertinent part: 
 
Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic 
communications networks to store information or to gain 
access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a 
subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the 
subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and 
comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 
95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing . . 
. .43 
 
However, an additional explanation in Recital 66 of the amending 
Directive tempers this seemingly strong language. 44  Recital 66 states: 
 
Third parties may wish to store information on the 
equipment of a user, or gain access to information already 
stored . . . . The methods of providing information and 
offering the right to refuse should be as user-friendly as 
possible. . . . Where it is technically possible and effective, 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of Directive 
95/46/EC, the user’s consent to processing may be 
                                                                                                                         
information collected can be considered personal data then, in addition to Article 5(3), 
Directive 95/46/EC will also apply.”).  Third party cookies will be discussed in more 
detail in Part II.D. 
 
42 See id. at 8.  
 
43 e-Privacy Directive, supra note 26, art. 5(3).  
 
44 A Recital is a part of an act or directive whose purpose “is to set out concise reasons 
for the chief provisions of the enacting terms, without reproducing or paraphrasing 
them.”  Joint Practical Guide: Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission, EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/techleg/10.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 
2011). 
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expressed by using the appropriate settings of a browser or 
other application.45  
 
Article 5(3) will often implicate behavioral advertisers, as it expressly 
applies to any party who places cookies or collects information from 
existing cookies stored on a data subject’s computer.46  Thus, most ad-
networks, due to their use of cookies, must operate within the confines of 
the e-Privacy Directive.47  Under the Working Party’s interpretation of the 
current framework, advertising networks must obtain informed consent 
from a data subject.48  The Working Party claims that consent under 
Article 5(3) requires an advertising network to: 1) give the user sufficient 
information about the data to be collected, as well as the purpose of the 
cookie, before asking a user for consent; 2) obtain consent before ever 
placing a cookie or collecting information from a user’s computer; and 3) 
allow for a user to revoke their consent.49 
 
[13] In response to varying interpretations among EU Member States, 
the Working Party addresses the question whether a user who fails to 
change default browser settings that allow cookies has given sufficient 
consent under the aforementioned test.50  The Opinion states that although 
advertising networks and content providers often inform users about third-
party cookies in their privacy policies, this practice, supported only by 
default browser settings, is unlikely to meet the requirements of informed 
                                                 
45 Amended e-Privacy Directive, supra note 27, at 34.  
 
46 See WP29 Opinion on Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 10. 
 
47 See id.    
 
48 See id. 
 
49 See id. at 13. 
 
50 See id.  
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consent under the data protection framework.51  The Working Party gives 
three rationales for this conclusion.   
 
[14] First, it concludes that under Article 2(h) of the Data Protection 
Directive, a browser cannot give valid consent for the collection and 
processing of a user’s information by default.52  The Working Party bases 
this finding on the average data subject’s ignorance of the extent to which 
companies track online behavior for marketing purposes.53  Further, if a 
company’s privacy policy instructs a data subject to change his browser 
settings to avoid tracking, the average Internet user may not have the 
technological savvy to properly change the settings.54 Second, even if 
browser settings could convey a user’s informed consent, the Working 
Party argues against the ability to bypass a user’s wishes through 
emerging technologies to track a user who has actively set his browser to 
block third-party cookies.55  Third, browser settings cannot accurately 
discern user consent and may construe initial or partial acceptance of 
cookies as sufficient to allow the placement of all future cookies, whether 
by different companies or for purposes unrelated to that prior consent.56  
 
[15] The Working Party also addressed the efficacy of an alternative 
consent mechanism, namely the opt-out programs offered by individual 
websites, ad-networks, and self-regulatory initiatives.57  While the 
                                                 
51 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 13.  
 
52 See id. at 14. 
  
53 See id.  
 
54 See id. (noting that only one of the four major browsers currently blocks third-party 
cookies by default upon installation).  
 
55 See id.  Examples of emerging technologies would include flash cookies, tracking 
beacons, or deep packet inspection.  Id.  
 
56 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 14. 
 
57 See id. at 15. 
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Opinion recognizes that these mechanisms attempt to complement or fix 
the problems created by securing consent through browser settings, it 
concludes they are insufficient.58  This is primarily because the average 
user will not know where or how to access the opt-out.59  Few users 
realize that, by not actively seeking the opportunity to opt-out, they are 
actually opting-in and offering their informed consent to be tracked.60  
Additionally, the failure to opt-out is a non-reaction that, by its nature, 
happens after data collection has already begun.61  A failure to opt-out is 
not prior-informed consent as required by Article 5(3).62 
 
[16] Finally, the Working Party expresses the view that prior opt-in 
mechanisms better deliver informed consent.63  The Opinion suggests that 
a company should notify a user before receiving, storing, or sending a 
cookie, and the information should contain specific details about each 
cookie.64  These details should include the identity of the advertising 
network, a disclaimer regarding what information will be collected, and a 
description of how the information will show the user targeted 
advertisements.65  After a user receives this message, they should have the 
choice of whether or not to consent.66  In order to address the practical 
problem of deciding to individually consent to an overwhelming number 
                                                 
58 See id. 
 
59 See id. 
 
60 See id. 
 
61 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 15. 
 
62 See id. at 16. 
 
63 See id.  
 
64 See id. 
 
65 See id. 
 
66 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 16. 
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of cookies, the Working Party suggests that consenting to one cookie 
should validate all the data that cookie may collect and transmit for a 
limited time, such as one year.67 
 
iii. Consent in Enforcement Actions and Case Law 
 
[17] While enforcement actions under the data protection framework 
have remained relatively limited, it is useful to examine the few instances 
in which a Member State’s Data Protection Authority (“DPA”) have 
enforced a data protection directive with regard to a breach of the 
directive’s consent requirements.68  The largest penalty in the Data 
Protection Directive’s history was levied over a consent violation in 
2001.69  The Spanish Data Protection Agency fined the television network 
Zeppelin TV one million euros for transmitting the personal data of 
television show participants to third-party advertisers without the 
participants’ consent.70  More recently in 2008, the Italian DPA fined GS, 
a supermarket chain, for using information collected from reward card 
applications and customer purchases to conduct targeted advertising 
without their customers’ consent.71  Finally, the German DPA brought the 
most recent enforcement action in 2010 against Deutsche Postbank AG for 
                                                 
67 See id. 
 
68 See CAREY, supra note 9, at 183. 
 
69 See TECH., MEDIA & TELECOMM. GRP., LINKLATERS, DATA PROTECTED 102 (Nov. 
2005), available at www.linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/tmt/dat aprotected05.pdf. 
 
70 See CAREY, supra note 9, at 183. 
 
71 See Supermarket Chain Fined for Unlawful Use of Customer Data, EUR. PRIVACY & E-
COM. ALERT (Hunton & Williams, L.L.P., Brussels, Belg.), Aug. 2008, at 2, available at 
http://www.hunton.com/european_data_protection_and_privacy (follow “Alerts” 
hyperlink; then follow “More” hyperlink; and select “European Privacy & E-Commerce 
Alert: August 25, 2008” hyperlink).   
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allowing thousands of independent sales agents to use the Bank’s 
customer records for sales purposes without the consent of its customers.72  
 
[18] Of the preceding examples, the GS enforcement action proves 
most relevant to the analysis of consent in behavioral advertising.  
Unfortunately, few details of the enforcement action have been published 
and the requisite level of consent necessary to use consumer information 
for behavioral advertising purposes remains unclear.73  However, even if 
interpretations of the GS enforcement establish the principle that targeted 
advertising requires explicit affirmative consent, it represents one 
enforcement action under one of the twenty-seven Member States’ 
implementing legislation.74   
 
[19] Case law addressing the issue of consent in a data privacy context 
is correspondingly thin, with only one such case heard by the European 
Court of Justice.75  In that case, Bavarian Lager Co., Bavarian Lager 
requested a copy of the minutes of a meeting during which various 
                                                 
72 See Hunton & Williams, LLP, German DPA Imposes €120,000 Fine on Deutsche 
Postbank AG, PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG (May 12, 2010, 10:49 AM), 
http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com.   
 
73 See, e.g., Stop Alle Carte Fedeltà se Spiano nel Carrello Della Spesa [Stop the Loyalty 
Cards in the Shopping Cart if You Spy], GARANTE PER LA PROT. DEI DATI PERS. (Reg. 
Tribunale di Roma, Rome, Italy), May 21, 2008, available at www.garantepr 
ivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=1522432 (search engine translation from Italian to English). 
 
74 See generally Declaration of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on ‘Recent 
Examples of Enforcement Actions Carried out by Data Protection Authorities’, WP 101 
(Nov. 25, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wp 
docs/2004/ wp101a_en.pdf (providing examples of data protection enforcement actions in 
various member states). 
 
75 See European Comm’n, European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Summary of Caselaw of 
EU Courts on Data Protection, at 8, 12 (June 2010) (Laraine Laudati), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/olaf/data/doc/Summary-caselaw-EU-courts.pdf (examining 
European Court of Justice decisions concerning data protection from 2001 to 2010 in 
which only one case mentions the issue of consent).  
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government officials and industry representatives determined the 
company’s ability to sell its product in England.76  The reply to the request 
stated that it would release the minutes with the names of five parties 
redacted, including two parties who expressly objected and three who 
could not be reached.77  The Court held that the Commission properly 
refused to release the five names and established that, at least in these 
circumstances, silence or a failure to respond to a request for consent 
could not establish informed and free consent.78  
 
[20] An earlier case, British Gas Trading v. Data Protection Registrar, 
also discusses the principle that silence does not amount to consent.79  In 
that case, “the British Data Protection Tribunal drew a distinction between 
new and existing customers for the purpose of determining when the 
requirement of consent would be satisfied.”80  The Tribunal held that new 
customers of British Gas consented to advertising if they had the chance to 
opt-out in their initial contract for service.81  However when British Gas 
sent existing customers an additional opt out form, their failure to return 
the form could not qualify as consent.82  
 
[21] Given the dearth of enforcement actions and case law on the 
requirement of consent in the context of data protection, it is hard to draw 
                                                 
76 See Case C-28/08 P, Comm'n v. Bavarian Lager Co., 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 687, 
at *20 (June 29, 2010). 
 
77 See id. 
 
78 See id. at *40-42. 
 
79 See British Gas Trading Ltd. v. Data Prot. Reg., [1997/98] 1 Info. T.L.R. 393, at 415-
16 (Eng.), available at http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/DBFiles/Decision/i162/ 
british_gas.pdf.  
 
80 CAREY, supra note 9, at 67; see British Gas, [1997/98] 1 Info .T.L.R. at 415-16.  
 
81 See British Gas, [1997/98] 1 Info. T.L.R. at 415-16. 
 
82 See id. at 416. 
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a general picture of the status quo from either of these sources.  This 
ambiguity, combined with the wide variety of implementing legislation, is 
what the European Commission hopes to clarify by updating the Data 
Protection Directive.83 
 
C. Revising the Data Protection Directive 
 
[22] On November 4, 2010, the Commission explained the need to 
revise and update the original Data Protection Directive as a way to meet 
various challenges that have emerged over the past fifteen years.84  One 
such challenge is the threat posed by newer and increasingly sophisticated 
methods of collecting and analyzing personal data that have allowed for 
more effective targeting of individuals based on their behavior.85  Another 
major concern is the lack of uniformity between EU Member State’s 
implementing legislation, despite the common regulatory framework 
provided by the directives.86  The European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) views the resolution of these ambiguities as necessary "to enhance 
legal certainty, reduce the administrative burden and ensure a level 
playing field for economic operators."87  
 
                                                 
83 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 2, 8-9. 
 
84 See id. at 2. 
 
85 See id. 
 
86 See id. at 3-4. 
 
87 PETER HUSTINX, OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR ON THE 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE 
REGIONS - "A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ON PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION" 12 (2011), available at http://www.edps.europa.eu/ 
EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/ Consultation/Opinions/2011/11-01-
14_Personal_Data_ Protection_EN.pdf [hereinafter EDPS ON DATA PROTECTION 
REVISION]. 
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[23] One specific area of ambiguity between Member State’s legislation 
is the requirement of informed and free consent.88  For example, the 
requirements found in various Member States vary widely, from the need 
for written consent, to the acceptance of implicit consent derived from a 
user’s browser settings.89  EDPS argues that “[c]onsent that has been 
inferred by an action and more particularly by silence or inaction is often 
not an unambiguous consent.  However, it is not always clear what 
constitutes true, unambiguous consent.”90  EDPS further argues that this 
ambiguity prohibits effective consideration of citizens’ rights to the 
protection of personal data under the law.91  The Commission has stated 
that any revision of the Directive should clarify the conditions for a data 
subject’s ability and right to consent.92  The Commission also noted that 
the framework should strengthen the data subject’s ability to actively 
refuse consent.93  The problems stemming from an ambiguous conception 
of informed and free consent are nowhere more apparent than in the 
context of behavioral advertising. 
 
D. Emergence of Behavioral Advertising 
 
[24] Online advertising is big business.  In 2009, in the twenty-three EU 
Member States for which data is available, advertisers spent over 4.4 
Billion euros on display advertising.94  In the UK, approximately a third of 
                                                 
88 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 9. 
 
89 See id. at 8.  
 
90 EDPS ON DATA PROTECTION REVISION, supra note 87, at 18. 
 
91 See id. at 12. 
 
92 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 9.  
 
93 See id. at 14. 
 
94 See IAB, ADEX 2009 EUROPEAN ONLINE ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE 36 (Sept/ 2010), 
http://www.iab.fi/assets/Tiedotteet/Adexsyyskuu2010.pdf.  The IAB defines Display 
Advertising as when “an advertiser pays an Internet company for space to display a static 
or hyper-linked banner or logo on one or more of the Internet company’s pages.”  Id.  
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display advertising utilized behavioral targeting.95  Assuming this trend 
represents other EU Member States with mature advertising markets, 
advertisers spent billions of euros on behavioral advertising in 2009.96   
 
[25] The Article 29 Working Party defines behavioral advertising as the 
practice of tracking a data subject’s behavior online, in order to build 
profiles which deliver more relevant advertising during future browsing 
sessions.97  The parties involved in behavioral advertising take on three 
different roles.  The first is the advertising network provider (“ad-
network”) who performs the tracking, analyzes the data, and connects 
content publishers with advertisers.98  The second are advertising 
companies that want to promote a product or service to a specific 
                                                                                                                         
This type of advertising can be contrasted to the other dominant category, Paid Search, 
which the IAB defines as “[f]ees advertisers pay Internet companies to list and/or link 
their company site domain name to a specific search word or phrase.”  Id. 
 
95 See There's No Need to Talk to Strangers, MARKETINGWEEK (June 2010), 
http://www.marketingweek.co.uk/ disciplines/digital/digital-strategy-supplement/theres-
no-need-to-talk-to-strangers/3015004.article. 
 
96 Specific behavioral advertising data for many Member States is unavailable and its use 
may be lower in less mature or sophisticated markets than in the UK.  However, the top 
three mature markets (the UK, Germany and France) account for 64% of total advertising 
revenue in the EU.  See IAB, supra note 94, at 5.  Thus even if this trend only applies to 
the top three mature markets, almost a Billion Euros was still spent on behavioral 
advertising in 2009.  Id. at 8.  Since 2007, venture firms have invested $4.7 billion in 356 
online-ad firms, many based on a company’s ability to create a more detailed profile of 
individual users than the next company is capable of providing.  See Scott Thurm, Online 
Trackers Rake in Funding, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2011, at B1.  
 
97 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 3; see also 
MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, Who is Profiling Who? Invisible Visibility, in REINVENTING 
DATA PROTECTION? 239, 243-44 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009) (providing a fictional 
example of how online profiling operates). 
 
98 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 5.  
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audience.99  The third role belongs to content publishers, who earn 
revenue by displaying the ads on their website.100  
 
[26] Behavioral advertising companies glean information from a variety 
of sources, including what websites a user visits, how the user interacts 
with those sites, and content created by the user that is posted on publicly 
accessible websites or social networks.101  This information is then 
supplemented with information voluntarily provided by the user to 
websites.102  For instance, by entering your date of birth to verify your age 
on an alcohol company’s website, you could add your birthday to your 
profile.103  Similarly, a user’s physical location, as determined from their 
IP address, can become part of a user’s profile.104  Profiles created from 
these online sources can combine with traditional offline data to create a 
more comprehensive profile.105 
 
[27] The primary technology used by the behavioral advertising 
industry is the tracking cookie.106  Specifically, ad-network providers 
                                                 
99 Id. 
 
100 Id.  
 
101 See id. at 4. 
 
102 See, e.g., Ad Specifications, HULU (June 15, 2011), http://assets.huluim.com/down 
loads/hulu_ad_specs.pdf. 
 
103 See, e.g., Age Verification, LAPHROAIG,  http://www.laphroaig.com (last visited Sept. 
25, 2011) (showing that when prompted to become a Friend of Laphroaig, the user’s age 
is automatically imported into the user’s profile). 
 
104 See, e.g., id. 
 
105 See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE PROFILING: A 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofili 
ngreportjune2000.pdf [hereinafter ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS].  
 
106 Id. at 3.  
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begin the profiling process by tracking users through some form of 
“client-side processing” that consists of the physical storage of a 
filesuch as a cookieon a data subject’s computer.107  It is crucial to 
distinguish tracking cookies, or third-party cookies, from standard first-
party cookies used by almost every website.108  While tracking cookies are 
a controversial tool used by the behavioral advertising industry, standard 
cookies are innocuous and currently essential to the functionality of the 
modern Internet.109  
 
[28] First-party cookies are small text files placed on a computer by 
websites that a user visits that allow content providers to enhance basic 
functionality with features such as the storage of login information, layout 
preferences, and preferred payment methods or shipping addresses.110  
While the discussion of behavioral advertising often includes first-party 
cookies, the use of first-party cookies is widely accepted even without a 
user’s consent.111  To avoid confusion, the debate over the use of third-
                                                 
107 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 6. 
 
108 See Lori Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy: Cookies and Internet Privacy, 
COOKIECENTRAL.COM, http://www.cookiecentral.com/ccstory/cc3.html (last visited Sept. 
16, 2011) (explaining the dangers between first and third party cookies). 
 
109 See What Went Wrong?, COOKIECENTRAL.COM, http://www.cookiecentral.com/coo 
kie5.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).  
 
110 See Lori Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy: Introduction, COOKIECENTRAL.COM, 
http://www.cookiecentral.com/ccstory/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2011); Lori 
Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy: The Purpose of Cookies, COOKIECENTRAL.COM, 
http://www.cookiecentral.com/ccstory/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2011); 
Implementing Machine Language Privacy Requirements – User: First-Party Cookie, 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WEB ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.osec.d 
oc.gov/webresources/P3P_User_Admin_files/TextMostly/Slide17.html (last updated 
May 14, 2010). 
 
111 Implementing Machine Language Privacy Requirements – User: Cookies, DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE WEB ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.osec.doc.gov/webre sources/P3P 
_User_Admin_files/TextMostly/Slide10.html (last updated May 14, 2010); see 
Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy: Cookies and Internet Privacy, supra note 108. 
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party tracking cookies, discussed in more detail below, should not 
consider first-party cookies. 
 
[29] Typically, an ad-network places a tracking cookie on a user’s 
computer when a user first visits the website of one of the ad-network’s 
clients.112  Once the ad-network places the cookie, it can recognize it 
anytime the same user browses to a webpage where the ad-network may 
operate.113  By re-accessing the cookie at each new site the user visits, the 
ad-network builds a profile based on the user’s online behavior.114  Some 
of the Internet’s most visited websites allow multiple ad-networks to place 
tracking cookies on a user’s computer, a practice that can result in as many 
as 200 separate cookies being placed on a user’s computer in a single 
visit.115  
 
[30] As technologies emerge to help users exercise their privacy rights 
regarding cookies, ad-networks develop new technologies at an even faster 
pace.116  While older versions of cookies had expirations after which they 
no longer functioned, persistent cookies may remain active until deleted 
by the user.117  Ad-networks are also experimenting with hard to erase 
tracking technologies, such as flash cookies, tracking beacons, biometric 
profiling and deep packet inspection.118  These technologies can track 
                                                 
112 WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 6. 
 
113 Id. 
 
114 Id. 
 
115 See Julia Angwin, The Web's New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 31, 
2010, at W1; What They Know, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, http://blogs.wsj.com/wtk/ (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2011) (finding that dictionary.com places 234 tracking files in a single 
visit, comcast.net places 151, careerbuilder.com places 118, and msn.com places 207). 
 
116 See, e.g., WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 6. 
 
117 See id. 
 
118 See id.; Julia Angwin, Latest in Web Tracking: Stealthy 'Supercookies,' WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 18, 2011, at A1; Steve Stecklow & Paul Sonne, What They Know: A Wall Street 
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users outside of the controls built into today’s web-browsers, thus 
depriving users of the already limited ability to control their privacy 
settings.119  While the details of these new methods are technologically 
complex, the goal is the same: to create a tracking device that is not easily 
deleted, and, if deleted, has the ability to ‘re-spawn’ or ‘un-delete’ 
itself.120 
 
E. Concerns Regarding Behavioral Advertising 
 
[31] A recent study by England’s consumer protection agency, the 
Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”), found that 40% of consumers hold neutral 
views towards behavioral advertising, 28% percent dislike the practice, 
and 24% percent welcome it.121  Additionally, the OFT found that 
                                                                                                                         
Journal Investigation: Shunned Profiling Method on the Verge of Comeback, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 24, 2010, at A1 (“[D]eep packet inspection [technology] . . .  can be far more 
powerful than ‘cookies’ . . . because it can be used to monitor all online activity, not just 
Web browsing.  Spy agencies use the technology for surveillance.”).   
 
119 See Rodica Tirtea et al.,  Bittersweet Cookies: Some Security and Privacy 
Considerations, EUROPEAN NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY 8 (2011) [hereinafter 
ENISA Cookie Report], available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/it/ 
library/pp/cookies/.  
 
120 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 6-7.  
 
121 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, ONLINE TARGETING OF ADVERTISING AND PRICES: A 
MARKET STUDY 7 (2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_lea 
flets/659703/OFT1231.pdf.  Similar studies in the United States and Canada have found 
consumers are not in favor of behavioral advertising.  See JANET LO, PUB. INTEREST 
ADVOCACY CTR., A “DO NOT TRACK LIST” FOR CANADA 11 (2009), available at 
www.piac.ca/files/dntl_final_ website.pdf (“The majority of respondents (54%) [in a 
recent Canadian study] strongly supported the creation of a ‘Do Not Track List’, and an 
additional 27% of respondents somewhat supported a ‘Do Not Track List’ . . . .”); JOSEPH 
TUROW ET AL., CONTRARY TO WHAT MARKETERS SAY, AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED 
ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE IT 15 (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214 (finding that 66% percent of American adults do not 
want to be shown targeted advertising and that when told of how behavioral marketers 
gather their information, this percentage jumped to between 73% and 86%).  
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue1 
 
 24 
concerns over behavioral advertising decreased when consumers could, if 
they desired, opt-out of behavioral advertising and its related tracking 
activities.122  
 
[32] While individual concerns about behavioral advertising vary, many 
people simply feel violated upon learning that ad-networks compile and 
sell their personal details without their knowledge or consent.123  For 
instance, in the weeks leading up to a U.S. primary election last October, a 
sixty-seven year old woman named Linda Twombly was bombarded with 
advertisements urging her to donate and vote for a specific Republican 
candidate.124  The ads were eerily omniscient; Ms. Twombly was a 
Republican and did have a history of donating to political campaigns.125  
However, the ads were not based on information Ms. Twombly had 
volunteered to the candidate or the party.126  Rather, they were based on 
information sold to the candidate by a company whose algorithms 
determined these facts from Ms. Twombly’s online behavior.127 
 
[33] Another recent example of such behavior is a teenage girl who saw 
weight-loss ads every time she went on the Internet after an ad-network 
identified her as falling within a category of people desiring to lose 
weight.128  There is also the infamous example of a man who bought his 
                                                 
122 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 121, at 36. 
 
123 See HILDEBRANDT, supra note 97, at 242-43.  
 
124 See Emily Steel, What They Know: A Wall Street Journal Investigation: A Web 
Pioneer Profiles Users by Name, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2010, at A1. 
 
125 See id. 
 
126 See id. 
 
127 See id. 
 
128 Angwin, Gold Mine, supra note 115; see also Nicholas Carr, The Great Privacy 
Debate -- Tracking Is an Assault on Liberty, with Real Dangers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 
2010, (Weekend Journal), at W1; Transcript of Workship at 61:5-15, Fed. Trade Comm’n 
Roundtable Series 1 on: Exploring Privacy (Dec. 7, 2009) (Matter No. P095416), 
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wife a ring on Overstock.com only to have the purchase, complete with his 
51% discount, broadcast on his Facebook newsfeed.129  
 
[34] Furthermore, behavioral advertising has practical and economic 
consequences.  The European Network and Information Security Agency 
(“ENISA”) identified various technological threats presented by 
behavioral advertising, including network threats, end-system threats, and 
cookie-harvesting threats.130  These techniques can modify the 
information returned by cookies from a user’s computer to the ad-
networks, secretly collect a user’s information by impersonating cookies 
of legitimate websites, or recreate a user’s full search history from search 
engines such as Google.131   
 
[35] Other threats revolve around the claim of anonymity for behavioral 
profiles.  While most companies insist any data collected remains 
anonymous, newly created algorithms can “de-anonymize” these profiles 
by adding names, addresses, and phone numbers.132  A recent study found 
that third-party trackers increasingly link “anonymous” profiles to 
                                                                                                                         
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/privacyroundtables/PrivacyRoundtable 
_Dec2009_Transcript.pdf (describing the potential to target obese, anxious or other 
vulnerable market niches).   
 
129 See Sheppard Mullin, Efficiency v. Privacy: Is Online Behavioral Advertising Capable 
of Self-Regulation?, COVERING YOUR ADS BLOG, (Apr. 14, 2010), 
http://www.coveringyourads.com/2010/04/articles/advertising-law/efficiency-v-privacy-
is-online-behavioral-advertising-capable-of-selfregulation/. 
 
130 See ENISA Cookie Report, supra note 119, at 7. 
 
131 See id.  
 
132 See Steel, supra note 124; see also Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online 
Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 
450 (2007) (noting that offline sources used by data brokers include public records, the 
media and credit-reporting agencies and that data brokers “have been combining this off-
line data, traceable to specific individuals, with online data that they can match to those 
same individuals”). 
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personally identifiable information through the use of social networks.133  
One potential consequence of de-anonymization is the risk of identity theft 
if an individual hacks into an ad-network’s database.134  London 
Economics performed a case study that examined a recent incident 
involving TNS Infratest, a German marketing company engaged in 
behavioral profiling.135  The company held profiles on 90,000 German 
households, many of which contained detailed information including 
individuals’ names, addresses, dates of birth, education levels, marital 
status, household incomes, bank accounts, health insurance and even 
details on consumer purchases such as cars, mobile phones and 
computers.136  Unfortunately, the hacking of this database exposed all 
90,000 profiles.137   
 
[36] Similarly, a recent study at Carnegie Mellon University showed 
that hacking is not even necessary for identity theft.138  Using the same 
“anonymous” information generally found in behavioral advertising 
profiles such as place of birth and birth date, computer algorithms can 
determine Social Security numbers for “8.5% of people born in the United 
                                                 
133 ENISA Cookie Report, supra note 119, at 8; Balachander Krishnamurthy & Craig E. 
Wills, On the Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information Via Online Social 
Networks, 40 COMPUTER COMM. REV. 112, 117 (2010). 
 
134 See LONDON ECON., STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PRIVACY-ENHANCING 
TECHNOLOGIES (PETS) 204 (2010). 
 
135 Id. at 201-04.  
 
136 Id. at 201-02. 
 
137 Id. at 204 (discussing how the incentive to steal such data is high as a complete 
consumer profile that includes bank credentials can sell for as much $1,000 a person). 
 
138 Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security Numbers from Public 
Data, 106 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 10975, 10975 (2009); Steve Lohr, How Privacy 
Vanishes Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/0 
3/17/technology/17privacy.html?scp=9&sq=%22do%20not%20track%22&st=Search.  
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States between 1989 and 2003.”139  With access to the right software, 
almost five million Social Security numbers are potentially up for sale.140  
 
[37] Widespread profiling also allows for price discrimination and 
social sorting.141  Online price discrimination, or even the outright denial 
of service or products, is known as “weblining,” an online version of 
traditional economic discrimination practices such as “redlining” and 
“reverse redlining.”142  Weblining can create pricing schemes to 
discriminate between individual customers and can target especially 
vulnerable populations such as the poor or uneducated.143  Some of these 
potential harms are already being realized.  For example, British insurer 
Aviva recently used online data profiles in order to categorize potential 
insurance applicants in various risk profiles.144 
 
[38] Lee Tien, a senior staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, worries about what might happen if employers have access to 
profiles which allows them to see whether an employee is pregnant or 
considering trying to become pregnant.145  Tien raises similar concerns 
about other vulnerable populations that deserve anonymity, such as 
                                                 
139 Acquisti & Gross, supra note 138, at 10975; Lohr, supra note 138. 
 
140 See Lohr, supra note 138. 
 
141 See HILDEBRANDT, supra note 97, at 244. 
 
142 See ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 105, at 13, n.45 
(defining redlining and reverse redlining as “the practice of some financial institutions to 
not extend credit or to offer less favorable credit terms to prospecitve [sic] borrowers in 
predominantly minority areas”). 
 
143 See LO, supra note 121, at 53. 
 
144 Leslie Scism & Mark Maremont, Insurers Test Data Profiles to Identify Risky Clients, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2010, at A1.  
 
145 Stein, supra note 1. 
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political dissidents and battered women.146  Other scholars worry about 
the use of inaccurate data sets in determining the outcome of employment, 
dating, or educational decisions.147  Finally, as profiling becomes even 
more commonplace, a user’s attempts to shield personal data will have 
consequences of their own.148  For instance, a user who attempts to hide 
their data to remain anonymous may be discriminatorily denied service, 
forced to pay more, or simply categorized for their refusal.149 
 
F. Privacy by Design and Privacy Enhancing Technologies  
 
[39] The fundamental principal of Privacy by Design (“PbD”) is that a 
system should address privacy concerns in its design, as opposed to 
addressing these concerns once the system has become vulnerable.150  The 
collection-limitation principle, one of the core principals of PbD systems, 
requires that “the lawful collection of data” must take place with the 
informed “knowledge or consent of the data subject.”151  In this way, the 
principals of PbD compare remarkably to the consent requirements in the 
EU’s data protection framework.152  
 
[40] While the goal of PbD is technically possible today, few 
businesses attempt to implement its principles.153  To the contrary, Daniel 
                                                 
146 See id.  
 
147 See id. 
 
148 See LO, supra note 121, at 53 (claiming that online profiling may lead to a loss of 
consumer autonomy). 
 
149 See id.  
 
150 DANIEL LE MÉTAYER, Privacy by Design: A Matter of Choice, in DATA PROTECTION 
IN A PROFILED WORLD 323-24 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2010). 
 
151 Id. at 325.  
 
152 See id.  
 
153 See id. at 326.  
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Le Métayer, a leading expert in PbD systems, argues that most online 
systems actually fall into one of three categories, all of which fall short of 
PbD ideals.154  The first category is “non-privacy by design” where the 
“system deliberately infringes privacy rights.”155  Such systems are 
common and include any online registration system that requires 
information outside of what is required to process the immediate 
transaction.156  The next category is “non-privacy by non-design” where 
privacy issues are ignored throughout the design process.157  Such systems 
include websites that do not offer opt-out mechanisms or lack internal 
policies to destroy data after a set expiration period.158  The last category 
is “non-privacy by bad design” where the system’s design considers 
privacy concerns but falls short in the end.159  
 
[41] PbD attempts to provide users with a meaningful way to express 
their choices, despite the tendency of these choices to involve many 
subtleties or ambiguities, and for the system to respect those choices.160  
For example, a PbD system must take into account that routine consent 
does not have practical import.161  Examples of the routinization of 
                                                                                                                         
 
154 See id. 
 
155 MÉTAYER, supra note 150, at 326. 
 
156 See id. 
 
157 Id. 
   
158 Id.   
 
159 See id.   
 
160 See MÉTAYER, supra note 150, at 327. 
 
161 Roger Brownsword, Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and 
Confidentiality, in REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION? 83, 90 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 
2009). 
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consent abound, as anyone who has clicked “I agree” when installing 
software without reading the fine print well knows.162  
 
[42] Others argue for the use of Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
(“PET”).  Unlike Privacy by Design, PETs are not necessarily designed 
into the systems that implement them.163  A PET is defined as “[a] 
technology whose primary purpose is to enhance the privacy of a user.”164  
A study for the Dutch Ministry of the Interior defined PETs as a 
mechanism of “translation of ‘soft’ legal standards into ‘hard’ system 
specifications.”165  Successful PETs generally have a number of properties 
in common, including usability, deployability, effectiveness, and 
robustness.166  
 
[43] Many commentators suggest that PbD, PETs, or some combination 
of both, may provide an answer to the threat to privacy posed by 
behavioral advertising.167  Such efforts are technologically feasible.  For 
                                                 
162  See id. (mentioning routinisation by directing an agent to “sign here and here” or “just 
tick the box”). 
 
163 See LONDON ECON., supra note 134, at 14. 
 
164  Jane K. Winn, Technical Standards as Data Protection Regulation, in REINVENTING 
DATA PROTECTION? 191, 199 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009). 
 
165 Id. (quoting KPMG ET AL., MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND KINGDOM RELATIONS, 
THE NETH., PRIVACY–ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: WHITE PAPER FOR DECISION-MAKERS 
51 (Dec. 2004), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download 
?doi=10.1.1.101.7649&rep=rep1&type=pdf [hereinafter KPMG]. 
 
166 See LONDON ECON., supra note 134, at 14. 
 
167 See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 44-52 (December 2010), 
available at http://ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (recommending that 
companies “assess the privacy impact of specific practices, products, and services to 
evaluate risks and ensure that the company follows appropriate procedures to mitigate 
those risks”); Online Tracking and Behavioral Profiling, EPIC.ORG, 
http://epic.org/privacy/consumer/online_tracking_and_behavioral.html (last visited Oct. 
12, 2010).  
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instance, the browser Firefox recently announced it would implement a 
Do-Not-Track feature into the next version of its web browser, while 
Microsoft implements a similar initiative in Internet Explorer 9.168  
However, for these technologies to work, advertising networks must agree 
to respect users’ settings.169  To date, not a single company has agreed to 
participate in either of these programs.170 
 
G. Attempts at Self-Regulation in the Behavioral 
Advertising Industry  
 
[44] Recently, the behavioral advertising industry has begun a renewed 
attempt at self-regulation.171  Each of the major efforts, one in the U.S. 
and one in the EU, offers consumers information regarding behavioral 
advertising, creates a framework of best practices which member ad-
networks promise to abide by, and gives consumers the opportunity to opt-
out of behavioral advertising from selected ad-networks.172  Despite the 
apparent progress evidenced by these efforts, many commentators 
                                                                                                                         
 
168 Julia Angwin, Web Tool on Firefox to Deter Tracking, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748704213404576100441609997236.html; 
Cade Metz, Google, MS, Mozilla: Three 'Do Not Tracks' To Woo Them All: So Many 
Ways to Do One Simple Thing, THE REG. UK (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/14/google_mozilla_and_microsoft_do_do_not_trac
k/. 
 
169 See Angwin, Web Tool, supra note 168.  
 
170 See id.  
 
171 See generally Digital Adver. Alliance, The Self-Regulatory Principles for Online 
Behavioral Advertising, THE SELF-REG. PROGRAM FOR ONLINE BEHAV. PROGRAMMING, 
http://www.aboutads.info/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011); IAB Good Practice Principles, 
YOUR ONLINE CHOICES, http://www.youronlinechoices.com/good-practice-principles (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2011).  
 
172 See Digital Adver. Alliance, supra note 171; IAB Good Practice Principles, supra 
note 171. 
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question whether self-regulation provides the entire answer, given the 
behavioral advertising industry’s contrary incentives.173  
 
[45] In The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-
Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, Professor Dennis Hirsh outlines three 
broad critiques of self-regulation in online privacy.  First, “firms will put 
their own profits before ahead of the public interest [in privacy].”174  
Second, self-regulatory programs generally lack the power or will to truly 
enforce the guidelines against its members.175  Third, as long as 
membership in self-regulatory programs remains voluntary, most 
companies will choose to “free ride” on any good-will generated by the 
programs without restriction by the guidelines themselves.176 
 
[46] The first critique argues that it is not in the best economic interest 
of the ad-networks to effectively enroll consumers because each 
enrollment hurts their bottom line.177  As an illustration of this argument, 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) points out that the 
telecommunication industry’s self-regulatory efforts in the 1990’s 
managed to enroll just about 5 million consumers, versus the over 200 
million now registered in the FTC’s Do-Not-Call list.178  The trend will 
                                                 
173 See, e.g., CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY SELF 
REGULATION: A DECADE OF DISAPPOINTMENT 1, 15 (2005) [hereinafter EPIC], available 
at http://epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.html; Scott Foster, Online Profiling Is on the 
Rise: How Long Until the United States and the European Union Lose Patience with Self-
Regulation?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 258, 277 (2000); Mullin, supra note 129. 
 
174 Hirsch , supra note 132, at 458. 
 
175 Id. 
 
176 Id. at 459.  
 
177 See id. at 468. 
 
178 Compare EPIC, supra note 173, at 1, with Nate Anderson, Do Not Call List Tops 200 
Million, Some Scammers Still Ignore It, ARSTECHNICA.COM, http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/07/telemarketing-remember-just-how-bad-it-was.ars (last visited Sept. 
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most likely hold for behavioral advertising; in fact, the Network 
Advertising Initiative (“NAI”), the central mechanism for the new U.S. 
opt-out initiative, has offered a version of its new opt-out service, with 
little to no success.179  
 
[47] The second critique argues that, in addition to the limitations 
imposed by its voluntary membership, initiatives such as the NAI opt-out 
cannot be entirely successful because they lack the accountability and 
enforcement opportunities offered by equivalent government regulation.180  
In this vein, some commentators argue that because consumers have no 
way to monitor a company’s use of their information, they cannot 
discipline the company efficiently in the marketplace for violations.181  
 
[48] Third, maintaining a significant membership in a voluntary 
program such as NAI or IAB is unlikely.182  Critics point to NAI’s 
previous attempts at self-regulation as evidence.183  In 2000, NAI initiated 
a self-regulatory regime for online privacy and even appointed an 
independent organization to enforce violations.184  However, while the 
program started with twelve of the largest ad-networks, by 2003, its 
membership dwindled to just two.185  The independent enforcer slowly 
                                                                                                                         
15, 2011) (discussing how the Federal Trade Commission acknowledged the Do Not Call 
registry’s passing 200 million in numbers). 
 
179 See EPIC, supra note 173, at 9-10.  
  
180 See id. at 10.  
 
181 See Foster, supra note 173 at 262, 266. 
 
182 See Hirsch, supra note 132, at 458-59. 
 
183 Id. at 462.   
 
184 Id.  
 
185 Id. at 463; see EPIC, supra note 173, at 9-10 (“Further contributing to the irrelevance 
of NAI is the fact that its membership has depleted to two: DoubleClick and Atlas 
DMT.”). 
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stopped reporting compliance and enforcement statistics and, in 2006, 
scrapped the entire program.186  
 
[49] Finally, some critics argue that scattered self-regulatory programs 
are ineffective because users have to find, learn about, and apply to a 
potentially large number of competing opt-out programs.187  This is 
compounded in the behavioral advertising industry because the opt-out 
programs are generally limited to a small subset of ad-networks that 
choose to participate.188  Additionally, opt-out programs vary in efficacy.  
DoubleClick, a large advertiser, will still show users targeted ads even if 
they opt-out.189  DoubleClick only promises not to use what they 
themselves consider personal information to generate the ads.190  Finally, 
self-regulated opt-out programs are generally temporary because they rely 
on the user to not clear their cookies, a task many users concerned about 
privacy regularly do.191 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
[50] This Part will argue that the EU’s current legal framework is 
incapable of providing consumers with a meaningful method to consent or 
refuse to consent to behavioral advertising.  It will then argue that 
                                                                                                                         
 
186 Id. 
 
187 See Hirsch, supra note 132, at 455. 
 
188 See generally Digital Adver. Alliance, supra note 171 (“You can now visit the beta 
version of the Program’s Consumer Opt Out Page, which allows users to conveniently 
opt-out from online behavioral ads served by some or all of our participating 
companies.” (emphasis added)); IAB Good Practice Principles, supra note 171 
(providing a list of companies that are complying with the IAB Good Practice Principles).  
 
189 LO, supra note 121, at 50. 
 
190  Id. 
 
191 See id. 
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requiring a “Do-Not-Track” mechanism in the revised Data Protection 
Directive satisfies the Treaty of Lisbon, meets the twin objectives of the 
original Directive, and fulfills the five applicable revision objectives as 
expressed by the Commission.192  It will also consider and respond to 
various technological and economic criticisms of a Do-Not-Track 
mechanism.  Finally, the Article will argue against alternative solutions, 
including self-regulation. 
 
A. The Current Data Protection Framework 
 
[51] The EU’s data protection framework, as set out by the Data 
Protection Directive, e-Privacy Directives and the Treaty of Lisbon, 
purports to guarantee citizens the right to the protection of personal 
data.193  Behavioral advertisers must operate within the confines of the 
data protection framework because behavioral advertising requires the 
collection and use of Internet users’ personal data to track and target 
individuals based on their online activities.194  Ad-networks who engage 
in behavioral advertising must secure informed consent from users before 
engaging in behavioral advertising, or they risk violating a user’s right to 
the protection of personal data.195  
 
[52] Today, many experts believe that behavioral advertising violates a 
citizen’s right to the protection of personal data because ad-networks 
generally fail to secure informed consent from the user.196  The failure to 
                                                 
192 Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 5-10; see Treaty of Lisbon art. 16 B; Data 
Protection Directive, supra note 10, Preamble para. 7.  
 
193 Treaty of Lisbon art. 16 B; Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, Preamble para. 7; 
e-Privacy Directive, supra note 26. 
 
194 See supra Part II.D.  
 
195 See id. at 4. 
 
196 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 9; infra Part 
II.B.iii. 
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prevent such violations stems from the ambiguity surrounding the 
meaning of consent, which the data protection framework does not 
define.197  The failure to sufficiently define consent in the directives has 
frustrated efforts to clarify the meaning of consent in case law, 
enforcement efforts, and national implementing legislation.198  As a result 
of this ambiguity, ad-networks may act in violation of citizens’ rights 
without consequence.199  In 2010, the Commission called for an overhaul 
of the Directive, in part because of such ambiguities.200 
 
[53] It is crucial to note that past attempts to rectify issues in the data 
protection framework, including the adoption of the e-Privacy Directive 
and its amending Directive, have failed to resolve the ambiguity over the 
meaning of consent under the framework.201  By attempting to rectify the 
issue, the newer directives made similar mistakes as the original Data 
Protection Directive, namely, making ambiguous statements regarding 
informed and free consent and leaving the actual implementation and 
interpretation of its provisions to the twenty-seven EU Member States.202  
To meet the Commission’s stated goal of a uniform regulation that 
provides users with a chance to effectuate informed and free consent to 
behavioral advertising, any revision of the Data Protection Directive will 
have to be clearer and more specific than its predecessor legislation.203   
                                                 
197 See EDPS ON DATA PROTECTION REVISION, supra note 87, at 12 (“The Directive 
contains a number of provisions that are broadly formulated and that therefore leave 
significant room for diverging implementation.”). 
 
198 See id.; Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 8-9; supra Part II.B.iii.   
 
199 This is evidenced by the size of the behavioral advertising industry and the lack of 
enforcement actions over potential violations.  See supra Part II.B.iii.  
 
200 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 8-9. 
 
201 See id.  
 
202 See generally id. 
 
203 See id. at 7-8. 
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B. Proposal 
 
[54] A universal “Opt-Out” or “Do-Not-Track” mechanism satisfies the 
right to the protection of personal data, including the requirement of 
informed and free consent, under the Treaty of Lisbon and EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.204  The mechanism also meets the twin aims of the 
original Data Protection Directive, as well as each of the five applicable 
objectives outlined by the European Commission for the Data Protection 
Directive’s revision.205 
 
i. Framework for Potential Solutions 
 
[55] Any proposal for the revision of the Data Protection Directive must 
satisfy a variety of parameters.  First, any solution must, at its most basic 
level, satisfy the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in that “data must be 
processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of 
the person concerned . . . .”206  As discussed above, in the case of 
behavioral advertising, the current framework fails to secure this right.207  
Second, any proposal should attempt to meet the twin aims of the original 
Data Protection Directive: the protection of personal data and the free flow 
of information in commerce.208  Furthermore, since the adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the protection of personal data is more than an aim—it is 
                                                 
204 See generally Treaty of Lisbon art. 68; EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 
18, at 10 (explaining rights of protection for personal data). 
 
205 See generally Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 5-10 (outlining twin aims and five 
objectives). 
 
206 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 18, at 10; see Call for Revision, supra 
note 13, at 11. 
 
207 See generally supra Part II.B.ii (discussing problems with the current framework). 
 
208 Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 2; Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, paras. 
2-3. 
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a constitutionally guaranteed right.209  Finally, the Commission has 
outlined additional objectives for the revised legislation.  Five of these 
objectives are applicable to, and resolved by, the current proposal: (1) 
ensuring a coherent application of data protection rules; (2) providing a 
mechanism for users to effectuate informed and free consent; (3) 
strengthening individuals' rights in the face of new technologies; (4) 
increasing transparency; and (5) providing users increased control over 
their data.210   
 
ii. The Do-Not-Track Mechanism 
 
[56] A Do-Not-Track mechanism would utilize PbD and PET principles 
to build a tool that allows a user to provide informed and free consent 
through their web browser.211  As suggested by the Dutch Ministry of the 
Interior, the use of PETs would “[translate] the ‘soft’ legal standards” of 
the data protection directives “into ‘hard’ system specifications” that 
create a unified mechanism for informed and free consent for every citizen 
in the EU.212 
 
[57] The Do-Not-Track mechanism could work as follows: every 
browser would have an initial settings wizard where the user could choose 
their level of exposure to targeted advertisements while using the 
Internet.213  Users would receive information on behavioral advertising 
generally, and could read in greater detail about specific ad-networks, 
including their methods of data collection and types of analysis employed.  
                                                 
209 See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 21, at 68; Press Release, Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, supra note 20. 
 
210 Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 5-10. 
 
211 See Angwin, Web Tool, supra note 168; Metz, supra note 168; Winn, supra note 164, 
at 199; see also supra Part II.F. 
 
212 Winn, supra note 164, at 199; KPMG, supra note 165. 
 
213 See Angwin, Web Tool, supra note 168; Metz, supra note 168. 
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This wizard would be legally mandatory for a browser to offer to a user 
before the user is allowed to use a browser for the first time.214  Finally, 
the mechanism would never exclude first-party cookies so basic Internet 
functionality remains undisturbed.215  After a user sets their choices, ad-
networks could request permission from users to be added as an exception 
to a user’s general preference set.  This request should conform to the 
suggestions for transparency outlined by the Working Party.216  Thus, any 
request would need to include the types of data collected, the purposes of 
the collection, and the potential uses of the data by third parties.217 
 
iii. Satisfaction of Informed and Free Consent  
 
[58] First, and most importantly, the mechanism would satisfy the 
Treaty of Lisbon by providing users with the chance to express informed 
and free consent to tracking and behavioral advertising.218  While the 
Treaty of Lisbon uses general language regarding consent, the courts, 
enforcement authorities, and Article 29 Working Party have offered a 
limited degree of clarification.219  A Do-Not-Track mechanism would 
satisfy the findings of the courts and enforcement authorities that silence 
does not indicate consent.220  The principal that silence cannot equal 
                                                 
214 See generally supra Part II.B.ii (discussing the current issues with user data 
protection, and the need for a better method of informing users of data protection 
options). 
 
215 See supra Part II.D (discussing how first party cookies allow storage of logins, layout 
preferences, payment methods or shipping addresses). 
 
216 WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 15. 
 
217 See id. at 12-13. 
 
218 See Treaty of Lisbon art. 16 B. 
 
219 WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 13-17. 
 
220 See, e.g., Case C-28/08 P, Comm'n v. Bavarian Lager Co., 2010 EUR-Lex LEXIS 
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consent, derived from the Bavarian Lager and British Gas cases, contrasts 
with the current norm in many EU Member States where browser settings, 
even if left on default, are sufficient evidence of a user’s intent to provide 
consent.221  Under the current proposal, users must make an informed, 
affirmative decision; eliminating the risk that a user’s silence could 
suggest consent to an ad-network.222   
 
[59] To qualify as informed consent, the Data Protection Directive 
mandates that data subjects should be notified of the “identity of the [data] 
controller . . . the purposes of the processing . . . [and] any further 
information . . . in so far as such further information is necessary . . . to 
guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject.”223  The Working 
Party agrees that for truly informed consent, a user must receive 
transparent information regarding the placement of the tracking cookie.224  
The Do-Not-Track mechanism also satisfies this mandate.  Under the 
proposal, Member States, national DPA’s, or the Working Party could be 
                                                                                                                         
data to be transferred, the Commission complied with the provisions of Article 8(b) of 
Regulation No 45/2001.”). 
 
221 Compare id., and CAREY, supra note 9, at 66-67, with Warma & Kemppainen, supra 
note 32 (noting that Recital 66 of the E-Privacy Directive permits consent to be obtained 
via browser settings, the defaults of which generally allow cookies). 
 
222 See Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, art. 7(a); see also, WP29 Opinion on 
Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 13 (“[F]or consent to be valid . . . it 
must be freely given, specific and constitute an informed indication of the data subject’s 
wishes . . . before the personal data are collected, as a necessary measure to ensure that 
data subjects can fully appreciate that they are consenting and what they are consenting 
to.”). 
 
223 Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, art. 10. 
 
224 WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 17-18 (“The data 
subject should be clearly informed that the cookie will allow the advertising provider to 
collect information about visits to other websites, the advertisements they have been 
shown, which ones they have clicked on, timing etc.,” in such a manner that is “clear and 
comprehensive” and “as user friendly as possible”) (quoting Data Protection Directive, 
supra note 10, art. 10) (emphasis omitted). 
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tasked with creating the information presented to a user during the setup 
process in each user’s browser.  A user may consider the choice of 
whether and to what extent to consent to behavioral advertising, utilizing 
objective information provided by a trustworthy source.  This proposal 
represents a stark contrast from the status quo, in which consent appears to 
be sufficient no matter how uninformed the user happens to be.225 
 
[60] Finally, the Working Party’s interpretation of informed and free 
consent mandates that consent be easily revocable.226  Under the Do-Not-
Track proposal, by using a universal setting through the browser, a user 
could switch between allowing third-party tracking for all purposes, to 
allowing tracking for certain narrow purposes, to never allowing tracking 
at all, simply with the click of a button. 
 
iv. Satisfaction of the European Commission’s 
Objectives for Revision 
 
[61] The proposal for a Do-Not-Track mechanism also elegantly meets 
the stated objectives of the European Commission for the revision of the 
Data Protection Directive.227  First, the mechanism would ensure a 
coherent application of data protection rules, because the Do-Not-Track 
mechanism would be consistently implemented throughout the EU.228  
Under the proposal, ad-networks would have to respect a user’s decision 
to opt-out of all behavioral tracking, no matter what country the user is 
from, or what country the ad-network operates in.229 
                                                 
225 See, e.g., WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 11 
(“[T]he visitor's browser . . . automatically transfers such information to the ad network 
provider . . . because the publisher . . . set[s] up its web site in such a way that the visitor 
to its own web site is automatically redirected to the ad network provider web site.”).  
 
226 Id. at 13 (“[C]onsent must be revocable.”). 
 
227 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 5, 10, 13, 15, 17. 
 
228 See id. at 10. 
 
229 See id.; WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 23.  
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[62] The proposal would not only benefit Internet users, but also ad-
networks and other economic stakeholders, because the proposal would 
provide ad-networks and content providers with the certainty of whether 
they may engage in behavioral advertising with regard to a given user.  
Further, the proposal will enhance the free flow of information because 
resolving ambiguities over the definition of consent will “enhance legal 
certainty, reduce the administrative burden, and ensure a level playing 
field for economic operators.”230 
 
[63] Second, the Do-Not-Track proposal would provide a mechanism 
for a user to effectuate their informed and free consent.231  Part III(B)iii, 
above, discusses in detail the sufficiency of a Do-Not-Track mechanism to 
provide informed and free consent under the law.  A Do-Not-Track 
proposal would inform individuals of their rights and make them fully 
aware they are consenting.  Third, the Do-Not-Track platform would 
increase transparency by providing objective information to the user 
before making a choice.232  So long as the language used is “easy to 
understand . . . and plain language is used” the Do-Not-Track mechanism 
will satisfy the Commission’s recommendations.233  
 
[64] Fourth, the mechanism would strengthen individuals' rights in the 
face of new technologies because the Do-Not-Track platform would be 
technologically neutral.  A Do-Not-Track mechanism is technologically 
neutral because it would avoid banning certain technologies over others.  
Instead, it would alert ad-networks not to track a specific user, no matter 
what technology was used.  The Do-Not-Track mechanism would also 
strengthen a user’s individual rights by alerting a user that an ad-network 
                                                                                                                         
 
230 EDPS ON DATA PROTECTION REVISION, supra note 87, at 12. 
 
231 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 8-9.  
 
232 See id. at 6-7. 
 
233 Id. at 6. 
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had violated its privacy choices.  The browser technology could 
automatically check for cookies placed without the permission of the user, 
and the technology could be updated as needed to recognize new 
technologies as they were invented.234  These alerts could also help 
increase enforcement actions by documenting violations of the data 
protection rules.235  
 
[65] Fifth, a Do-Not-Track mechanism would provide users increased 
control over their own data in a variety of ways.  Not only could users 
specifically choose with whom they shared their information and how it 
should be used, the user could also choose to implement a strategy of data 
minimization.  This strategy could allow the user to decrease their risk of 
identity theft through hacking or fraud, or simply provide a user with the 
feeling of autonomy that comes from the control of their own personal 
information. 
 
C. Challenges to a Do-Not-Track List 
 
[66] Critics commonly offer four main challenges to the 
implementation of a Do-Not-Track mechanism.  First, critics assert that a 
Do-Not-Track mechanism would destroy the basic functionality of the 
Internet.236  Second, that a mechanism placing users on a Do-Not-Track 
                                                 
234 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 6 (“The Commission will consider how to 
ensure a coherent application of data protection rules, taking into account the impact of 
new technologies on individuals’ rights and freedoms . . . .”). 
 
235 See id. at 9. 
 
236 See Jack Marshall, Feasibility of FTC 'Do-Not-Track' Option in Doubt, CLICKZ.COM 
(Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/1930130/feasibility-ftc-track-option-
doubt (statement of Pam Horan, president of Online Publishers Association) ("We’re 
concerned about the concept of do-not-track if it specifically impacts the first party 
[publisher sites] . . . .  Cookies are really critical to the operation of publishers' websites 
to do a variety of things.").  
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list would in-itself place users’ privacy at risk.237  Third, that by 
destroying a premium income stream, many websites will not be able to 
stay in business, or will be forced to bombard users with generic ads.238  
And fourth, that a Do-Not-Track mechanism is technologically 
infeasible.239  
 
[67] The first argument is misguided in that it assumes a Do-Not-Track 
mechanism would simply block all cookies, thus removing functionality 
such as saved logins, favorite shipping addresses or customized page 
layouts.240  However, as discussed above, the Do-Not-Track mechanism 
would simply alert ad-networks not to track a user; the mechanism would 
not block cookies on its own.  Furthermore, the system would not ban or 
even discourage the use of first party cookies.  Consequently, under the 
current proposal, the concerns of the first critique are moot.   
 
                                                 
237 See Heather Osborn Ng, Targeting Bad Behavior: Why Federal Regulators Must Treat 
Online Behavioral Marketing as Spyware, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 369, 386-87 
(2009) ( “[A] ‘do not track’ registry could cause more privacy problems than it fixes . . . . 
[A] ‘do not track’ program would allow the government to collect too much personally 
identifiable information from the public . . . .”).  
 
238 See Catherine Holahan, 'Do Not Track' Could Backfire, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Nov. 5, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov20 
07/tc2007114_372892.htm (discussing how the adoption of Do-Not-Track could lead to a 
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Wyatt, Legislators Support Internet Privacy, but Question How to Achieve It, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at B3 (statement of Joan Gillman, executive vice president of Time 
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and by Web sites that rely on advertising revenues, [as well as] inhibit innovation and the 
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239 See Christopher Wolf, We Don't Need 'Do Not Track', BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Nov. 12, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov 
2007/tc2007119_029422.htm (“Compiling and applying a list of those who do not want 
tailored advertising will be a technological nightmare.”).  
 
240 See Marshall, supra note 236. 
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[68] The second argument, that a Do-Not-Track mechanism creates its 
own privacy risks,241 does not apply to the specifics of this proposal.  
Unlike the FTC’s Do-Not-Call list,242 users’ IP addresses or other 
identifying information would not be placed in a central list accessible to 
advertisers.  Here, rather than creating a central list, the browser itself 
alerts companies not to track and target an anonymous user.243  This alert 
need not contain any personal information beyond the fact the user does 
not wish to be tracked. 
 
[69] The third and most widely voiced critique is that a Do-Not-Track 
mechanism will end the Internet as we know it by eliminating a major 
source of premium advertising revenue.244  This critique is premised on 
the notion that behavioral ads sell for multiple times that of a generic 
advertisement.245  Critics argue that the option to opt-out will limit the 
number of behavioral advertisements shown to users, and therefore fewer 
ads will command premium pricing on any given website.246  There are 
some important flaws and caveats to this line of reasoning.  
 
[70] Under current EU Law, including the Directives and the Treaty of 
Lisbon, users already have the ability to consent or refuse to consent to the 
                                                 
241 See Ng, supra note 237, at 386.  
 
242 Cf. Rebecca Bolin, Note, Opting Out of Spam: A Domain Level Do-Not-Spam 
Registry, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399, 429 (2006). 
 
243 See Kristen J. Mathews & Margaret Dale, What Do You Really Need to Know About 
the FTC’s Recent Report on Privacy?, 19 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 33 (2011). 
 
244 See, e.g., Holahan, supra note 238; Wyatt, supra note 238. 
 
245 See Angwin, Gold Mine, supra note 115 (“Targeted ads command a premium. Last 
year, the average cost of a targeted ad was $4.12 per thousand viewers, compared with 
$1.98 per thousand viewers for an untargeted ad, according to an ad-industry-sponsored 
study in March.”).  
 
246 See, e.g., Holahan, supra note 238; Wyatt, supra note 238. 
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use of their personal data in the behavioral advertising context.247  In this 
sense, the Do-Not-Track mechanism only changes the ease with which 
users can express their already existent legal rights.  More effective 
enforcement of existing laws and regulations should not be framed as a 
negative, even if there is an economic impact.  Because a Do-Not-Track 
mechanism would simply increase the efficiency with which consumers 
can express their legal rights, ad-networks have no right to complain about 
potential economic losses.  Importantly, many users will choose to 
ultimately allow behavioral advertising.248  In the most recent European 
study, almost 65% of respondents stated opinions either neutral to or in 
favor of targeted ads.249  A majority of the premium income stream should 
remain viable after the implementation of a Do-Not-Track mechanism.250  
Finally, online advertising only accounts for 10% of total advertising 
expenditures, and this has only been the case for the past few years.251  
Websites provided free content supported by advertising revenue before 
behavioral advertising became a widespread phenomenon. 
 
D. Alternative Solutions 
 
i. Self-Regulation 
 
[71] The advertising industry has had fifteen years since the adoption of 
the Data Protection Directive in which to institute meaningful self-
regulation.252  By all accounts, they have failed.253  The recent and widely 
                                                 
247 See EDPS ON DATA PROTECTION REVISION, supra note 87, at 12.  See generally 
Treaty of Lisbon Declarations 20, 21; Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, 
Preamble, para. 9; e-Privacy Directive, supra note 26. 
 
248 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 121, at 7. 
 
249 Id. 
 
250 Cf. Wyatt, supra note 238. 
 
251 See IAB, supra note 94, at 10. 
 
252 See Call for Revision, supra note 13, at 2.  
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publicized initiative by the Internet Advertising Bureau UK must be 
viewed with a certain amount of skepticism.254  Rather than viewing this 
latest attempt as the industry finally deciding to address the privacy 
concerns created by behavioral advertising, it represents the industry’s 
last-ditch attempt to avoid stricter regulation. 
 
[72] As discussed above in Part II(G), self-regulation fails at providing 
the rights and protections guaranteed by the data protection framework 
and Treaty of Lisbon for three key reasons.255  First, ad-networks have no 
economic incentive to succeed at self-regulation beyond the level 
necessary to delay or prevent actual regulation.256  Second, self-regulation 
programs generally lack meaningful enforcement mechanisms.257  Third, 
self-regulation initiatives are voluntary and result in scattered systems that 
fail to present a single and easily usable consent mechanism for the 
consumer.258  Historical analogs also suggest that self-regulatory efforts 
are doomed to be insufficient, while eventual governmental regulations, 
such as the Do-Not-Call list in the U.S., have found vast success.259 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
253 See EPIC, supra note 173, at 9; Foster, supra note 173, at 281; Hirsch, supra note 132, 
at 460. 
 
254 See IAB Good Practice Principles, supra note 171. 
 
255 See Hirsch, supra note 132, at 458-59. 
 
256 See id. at 458. 
 
257 See id. 
 
258 See id. at 458-59. 
 
259 See EPIC, supra note 173, at 2; Anderson, supra note 178 (“Today, 200 million 
numbers are on the US Do Not Call list, and the government has generally forbidden all 
telemarketing calls.  Taken together, these two rules fundamentally changed the 
telemarketing business.”). 
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ii. Suggestions of the Article 29 Working Party  
 
[73] The Article 29 Working Party’s primary recommendation, that a 
user give their informed consent upon the placement of any third-party 
cookie is impractical.260  A user would have to decide to accept or reject 
every third-party cookie an ad-network attempted to place on their 
computer, a task, which could easily tally in the thousands during 
everyday browsing.261  Many of the Internet’s most visited websites install 
over one hundred third-party cookies during a single visit.262  To require a 
user to make an individual decision regarding each cookie is impossible 
without destroying the usability of the Internet.263  Even if this solution 
has the advantage of allowing users to exactingly distinguish between an 
ad-network with moderate tracking practices and those with extreme or 
experimental practices, it is impractical to design a system that requires 
such repeated consent from the user.  
 
[74] To combat this flaw, the Working Party suggests that consent to a 
third-party cookie should last for a full year.264  This does not solve the 
problem, however, because each visit to a new website would still be 
painful or impossible for the user.265  Finally, even if a user was forced to 
go through a yes/no decision based on unique information for each ad-
network, the challenges of “consent fatigue” and general apathy will 
                                                 
260 See WP29 Opinion on Online Behavioural Advertising, supra note 36, at 16.  
 
261 Cf. What They Know, supra note 115 (illustrating the number of tracking files installed 
on computers by popular websites).  
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265 See Jeff Atwood, Your Session has Timed Out, CODING HORROR (Apr. 15, 2008), 
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creation of cookies for individual browser requests).  
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue1 
 
 49 
render the choices meaningless, thus destroying the possibility of 
meaningful consent that the mechanism should provide.266 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
[75] This Article argues for a wide reaching and comprehensive 
proposal, yet some additional steps remain.  First, the browser technology 
will need to be perfected.  Currently Firefox and Internet Explorer are 
developing technologies that could provide the basis for a Do-Not-Track 
mechanism.267  Under this proposal, the Do-Not-Track technology would 
need to be uniform across browsers and be technologically capable of 
functioning in the manner outlined by this Article.268  This process will 
take both time and money, and the question remains of who should pay for 
this development.269   
 
[76] Second, Member States, DPA’s, the Article 29 Working Party, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, or some combination thereof, would 
need to conduct a public awareness campaign before implementing the 
Do-Not-Track platform.270  Alerting users of their privacy choices and 
explaining them beforehand would minimize the risk of users simply 
clicking through the consent wizard upon installation.271  It is important to 
                                                 
266 See Brownsword, supra note 161, at 90 (warning against the “routinisation” of 
consent). 
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alert consumers to the benefits of targeted advertising, including increased 
relevancy of advertisements and coupons, so that consumers can make 
objective choices.272 
 
                                                 
272 See Metz, supra note 168. 
